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Note
Daubert Rises: The (Re)applicability of the
Daubert Factors to the Scope of Forensics
Testimony
Geoffrey M. Pipoly*
On May 6, 2004, Brandon Mayfield’s life was turned upside
down. The thirty-eight-year-old attorney’s home was raided by
federal agents, and Mayfield was arrested pursuant to an FBI
investigation of the March 2004 Madrid train bombings which
1
killed ninety-one civilians. The basis for the FBI’s interest in
Mayfield was fingerprint evidence: Spanish police lifted prints
from the scene of the bombing, which were then run through
2
FBI and Interpol databases. The FBI told Mayfield that “his
fingerprints matched those of the Madrid train bomber, and
3
that he was the prime suspect in a crime punishable by death.”
Indeed, the FBI’s affidavit underlying Mayfield’s arrest claimed
that Mayfield’s fingerprints were a “100% positive identifica4
tion” to the prints lifted from the scene of the bombing. However, the FBI’s theory had one critical flaw: Mayfield was innocent. The fingerprint evidence on which the FBI relied was
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1. Garrett Epps, Vengeance Is Brandon Mayfield’s, SALON (Oct. 3, 2007,
11:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/10/03/brandon_mayfield.
2. Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 503 (2010).
3. Id. at 967.
4. Id.
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5

erroneous; Mayfield was not involved in the Madrid bombing.
Mayfield was quickly exonerated, and no criminal trial was ever held. But if Mayfield’s case had gone to trial, what might his
fate have been if an FBI analyst had testified with certainty
that Mayfield’s fingerprints were a “100%” match?
If Mayfield’s case had gone to trial, the admissibility of the
forensics testimony against him would have been governed by
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which permits expert testimony
6
based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”
The seminal United States Supreme Court case defining Rule
702’s contours in federal court is Daubert v. Merrell Dow
7
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in which the Court held that scientific
8
evidence must be both “relevant” and “reliable” to be admissible, and outlined a five-factor test to aid district courts in their
9
reliability determinations. Daubert is clear that the “overarching subject” of a court’s inquiry should be the “scientific validity . . . of the principles that underlie” a proffered theory or
10
technique. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court clarified Daubert, explaining that although reliability was still the
sine qua non of admissibility for expert testimony, the Daubert
11
factors were not dispositive in every case. Kumho Tire held
that judges may formulate reliability criteria on a case-by-case
basis that relied “on the nature of the issue, the expert’s partic12
ular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.”
At admissibility hearings, federal district courts must assess the reliability of forensics testimony for admissibility, either by applying the Daubert factors or some other case-specific
5. See id. (“On May 20, 2004, news reports revealed that Spain had
matched [Mayfield’s ostensible fingerprint] with a man named Ouhane Daoud,
an Algerian citizen. Mayfield was released from prison the following day.”).
6. FED. R. EVID. 702.
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. Id. at 589.
9. Id. at 592–94 (explaining that, in assessing the reliability of scientific
evidence, courts should consider empirical testing (falsifiability) of the technique; peer review of the technique; known or potential error rate of the technique; existence and maintenance of standards controlling operation of the
technique; and general acceptance of the technique in the field).
10. Id. at 594 –95.
11. See 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (“[ W ]e can neither rule out, nor rule in,
for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned
in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category
of expert or by kind of evidence. Too much depends on the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.”).
12. See id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137 (No. 97-1709)).
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reliability criteria suggested by Kumho Tire. At these hearings,
forensics experts commonly testify that their methods are either traditional “science” or “firmly rooted in the scientific
13
14
method” without legitimate bases in science for those claims.
15
Despite the vast subjectivity their techniques entail, forensics
16
practitioners often express their findings in “bold absolutes.”
For example, a firearm-and-toolmark analyst may testify that a
bullet from a crime scene was fired by a suspect’s gun, “to the
17
exclusion of all other firearms in the world,” or a fingerprint
analyst may testify that the discipline of fingerprint analysis is
18
more than ninety-nine percent accurate. Nonetheless, courts
almost categorically admit forensics testimony without limita19
tion or nuance.
This Note presents a new framework for courts grappling
with the treatment of forensics evidence and argues that the
Daubert factors themselves hold the key to balancing courts’
need to admit forensics testimony against well-founded concerns surrounding the scientific reliability and validity of forensic techniques. Part I provides an overview of the field of forensics, explains its deficiencies with regard to scientific
13. See, e.g., Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundations of
the Firearms and Tool Mark Identification Discipline: Responding to Recent
Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 586, 586 (2007); see also United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167, 2007 WL 485967, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007)
(“There is a method and science behind firearm-and-toolmark identification.”);
United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 (D. Md. 2004) (equating fingerprinting analysis with “science”).
14. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims
in Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1204 n.64
(2010) (“The notion that forensic individualization claims are extreme and
fundamentally unscientific is neither a radical idea nor one that is original
with us.”).
15. See Daniel L. Cork et al., Some Forensic Aspects of Ballistic Imaging,
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 481 (2010) (“[C]urrently, the interpretation of individualization/identification is subjective in nature . . . .”(internal citations
omitted)); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 571 (E.D.
Pa. 2002) (discussing the amount of subjectivity inherent in expert fingerprint
examiners’ testimony).
16. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING 67 (Daniel L. Cork et
al. eds., 2009).
17. Id.
18. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (reporting a fingerprint expert’s testimony that his field had a “proficiency error rate of just under one percent.”).
19. See Elizabeth L. DeCoux, The Admission of Unreliable Expert Testimony Offered by the Prosecution: What’s Wrong with Daubert and How to
Make It Right, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 131, 132 (“[P]rosecutors fending off challenges to the reliability of their expert witnesses enjoy a success rate of ninetytwo percent in trial courts and ninety-eight percent in appellate courts.”).
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notions of falsifiability and validity, and introduces the existing
evidentiary framework under which forensics testimony is admitted. Part II explores courts’ rationale for admitting these
techniques (and their scientific flaws), and critically distinguishes the admissibility of evidence from the scope of a witness’s testimony. Part II also suggests that forensics’ scientific
deficiencies are insufficient to warrant such techniques’ wholesale exclusion, but are sufficient to warrant significant limits
on the scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony once they take
the witness stand at trial. Part III proposes a framework courts
should use for limiting the scope of forensics practitioner’s testimony: applying the Daubert factors (currently used only to determine the admissibility of evidence) to the weight and scope
of forensics testimony. Consequently, under the methodology
this Note proposes, the scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony would be limited to avoid existing problems permissible
under the current framework.
I. FORENSICS AND FRAMEWORKS
This Part introduces forensic techniques and the legal tests
courts apply when considering their admissibility in litigation.
Section A provides an overview of the goals of forensics as compared to traditional science and shows why forensics fail to
meet scientific standards of falsifiability and validity. Section B
summarizes the legal framework though which forensics are
analyzed in federal court. This Part also explains why, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho Tire, lawyers wrongly believed that scientific problems with forensics might have legal
significance.
A. FORENSICS “SCIENCE?”
The term “forensics” refers not to a single unified discipline, but is a broad term encompassing a diverse array of prac20
tices and techniques typically employed by the state to gener20. Although many disciplines fall under the broad term “forensics,” some
examples of forensic disciplines include general toxicology; firearms/toolmarks;
controlled substances; impression evidence; blood-pattern analysis; crime scene investigation; and digital evidence. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (2009); see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
STATUS AND NEEDS OF FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE PROVIDERS: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 2 (2006), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/213420.htm.
Although this Note is concerned with the evidentiary framework for forensics
generally, many of its examples will be of two fields in particular: fingerprinting ( long considered the “gold standard” of forensic reliability), 1 DAVID L.
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ate evidence to aid in the investigation and prosecution of
21
crimes. Although many individual fields in the forensics uni22
verse claim a basis in science or roots in scientific principles,
the types of techniques employed by forensics practitioners depart from the methods and practices of traditional science in
several meaningful ways.
Traditional science is grounded in the scientific method,
23
which begins with an empirical question about the world, followed by theories that scientists propose to answer the ques24
tion, and hypotheses to test those theories. Empirical studies
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY: STATISTICS & RESEARCH METHODS § 1:30 (2008–2009
ed.), and firearm-and-toolmark analysis.
21. See 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY: FORENSICS § 29:3 (describing forensics practitioners as the “hired help” of the state, and arguing that unlike other disciplines that seek to gain objective knowledge about the world, forensics
historically arose with a specific purpose in mind, the investigation and prosecution of crimes).
22. See, e.g., Suzanne Bell, Forensic Chemistry, 2 ANN. REV. ANALYTICAL
CHEMISTRY 297, 313 (2009) (arguing that although forensic chemists must
“meet the requirements of both the scientific community . . . and the legal
community,” scientific concerns that underlie the practice are paramount);
Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives’ Tales, and
Ipse Dixet: Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue, 16
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2010) (stating that forensic fire-scene reconstruction
is “based upon relevant scientific principles and research”); Ronald Nichols,
The Scientific Foundations of Firearms and Tool Mark Identification—A Response to Recent Challenges, CAL. ASS’N CRIMINALISTS NEWS, 2d Quarter 2006,
at 9, available at http://firearmsid.com/Feature%20Articles/nichols060915/
AS%20Response%20110805.pdf (arguing that “Firearms and Tool Mark Identification is [r]ooted in [s]ound [s]cientific [f ]oundations”); Standard Terminology of Friction Ridge Examination, SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION
RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY AND TECHNOLOGY, 1 (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www
.swgfast.org/documents/terminology/110323_Standard-Terminology_3.0.pdf (describing the ACE-V fingerprinting identification method as “a scientific method”).
23. “Is the moon made of green cheese?” and “Is astrology valid?” are empirical questions: they inquire as to something that can be established through
observation, testing, and data gathering. See, e.g., 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra
note 20, § 5:3 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Is the death penalty moral?” and “Does God exist?” are not empirical questions: their answers are not
“confined to the natural world.” See id.
24. See WILLIAM D. CRANO & MARILYNN B. BREWER, PRINCIPLES AND
METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 5 (2d ed. 2002) (“One of the most important . . . methods of hypothesis generation involves the logical deduction of
expectations from some established theory . . . : Theory X implies that B will
result from A. We hypothesize that if X is true, producing A will result in the
occurrence of B.”); MARK MITCHELL & JANINA JOLLEY, RESEARCH DESIGN EXPLAINED 116 (1988) (“The simple experiment starts with an experimental
hypothesis . . . .”).
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and tests are then designed and performed to attempt to dis25
confirm, or falsify, the hypothesis. This attempt to falsify one’s
26
hypotheses is traditional science’s end-goal. Theories that
survive multiple, evolving attempts at falsification become accepted and relied upon when examining future questions because “a theory that that can withstand such scrutiny is one
27
that deserves credence.”
Forensics practitioners, by contrast, are concerned with
28
making comparisons. For example, forensics practitioners
might make comparisons between two fingerprints, or between
a shell casing and a firearm. Relying on assumptions about
those items, forensics practitioners draw conclusions about
those comparisons—for example, whether the two fingerprints
originate from the same source, or whether the shell casing was
fired from the firearm in question. This methodology departs
from traditional science because the goal of forensics comparisons is not to falsify a theory about the probable match between
29
two items, but to confirm the theory that the two items match.
Moreover, forensic methods lack falsifiability because
many forensic practices rely on the subjective judgment of the
30
examiner rather than objectively observable data. Although
25. See ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 40–
44 (2007) (describing the relationship between empirical testing and falsifiability); 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 5 (describing the scientific method).
26. See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH
OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (3d ed. 1969) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”).
27. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 5:5.
28. See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 29:6 (“The forensic scientist
undertakes to compare evidence found at the crime scene to evidence known to
belong to a suspect.”).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that a firearm-and-toolmark expert “compares the height, depth,
width, length and spatial relations of their striations. Significant similarity
between striations signals an ‘identification’ or a ‘match’—that is, the bullets
were fired from the same firearm” while not indicating that the expert looks
for dissimilarities); WILLIAM J. BODZIAK, FOOTWEAR IMPRESSION EVIDENCE:
DETECTION, RECOVERY, AND EXAMINATION 347 (2d ed. 2000) (“Positive identifications may be made with as few as one random identifying characteristic . . . .”); 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 21, § 29:40 (“Whenever a fingerprint
analyst encounters a fingerprint with a dozen or so matching characteristics
and one dissimilarity, he will invariably rationalize the dissimilarity somehow, even if the rationalization is contrived.”).
30. See Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An “Intellectually Honest” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299,
339 (2007) (“[T]he process [of forensic identification] is entirely subjective in
that an examiner’s discriminatory ability (or inability) is based wholly on his
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specific physical characteristics or constituent data about evidence may be determined absent the examiner’s subjective
31
judgment, she must apply her subjective judgment based on
her experience as an examiner, rather than quantitative data,
when determining whether the evidence supports a conclusion
32
that two items match.
Forensic techniques also lack scientific validity. In traditional science, validity refers to a measure or test’s ability to
33
measure what it purports to measure. Because forensics practitioners’ conclusions rest heavily on experience and subjective
judgment rather than objective experimentation it is difficult, if
not impossible, to objectively determine if forensics practition34
ers’ conclusions are scientifically valid.
Recent independent studies confirm forensics’ scientific deficiencies. Two recent congressionally funded reports by the
35
National Research Council found that, with the exception of
nuclear DNA analysis, “no forensic method has been rigorously
shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence
36
and a specific individual or source.” These reports called for
further study of the scientific reliability of various forensics
experience and training.”); Michael J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact
of Kumho Tire on Forensic Identification Science, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
879, 883 (2000) (“Forensic identification science examinations are overwhelmingly subjective affairs.”).
31. For example, the number of “ridge-marks” or “whorls” on a fingerprint
may be measured by a computer, as might the physical depth, frequency, and
length of tool marks on a shell casing.
32. See, e.g., Bradford T. Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic
Latent Fingerprint Decisions, 108 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 7733, 7733
(2011) (stating that fingerprint examiners “use[ ] their expertise rather than a
quantitative standard to determine if the information content [from a set of
prints] is sufficient to make a decision”).
33. See KELLY M. PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CHALLENGES OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES AND THE MEDICO-LEGAL INVESTIGATION
SYSTEM 241–45 (2007) (discussing the scientific method and its requirements
of validity).
34. See id. at 245–75 (noting some difficulties of proving the validity of
forensics practitioners’ conclusions).
35. BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 20.
36. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 7; see also BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16, at 3 (“The validity of the fundamental assumptions of
uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been
fully demonstrated.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 111–83
(contrasting principles of scientific knowledge and the scientific method with
those that underlie forensic techniques).
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37

disciplines. One such study examined fingerprint analysis
from a scientific perspective, subjecting fingerprint analysts to
38
double-blind tests to gauge the accuracy of the process. The
study concluded simultaneously that, although it is possible to
establish systematic methods by which fingerprint analysis can
39
be tested, the interpretation of data in fingerprint analysis
40
“relies on the expertise of latent print examiner,” and that
“[e]xaminers frequently differed on whether fingerprints were
41
suitable for reaching a conclusion.”
In short, forensics fail to meet basic scientific principles of
falsifiability and validity. This is significant, for it has the potential to affect both a court’s admissibility decision, and the
scope of the expert’s testimony once on the witness stand.
B. THE STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY: DAUBERT AND KUMHO
TIRE
Case law governing the admissibility of expert testimony
has evolved substantially over time. From 1922 to 1993, the
admissibility of expert testimony in federal court was governed
42
by Frye v. United States. In Frye, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals considered a criminal defendant’s challenge to the admissibility of the results of his systolic blood pressure test, the
technological precursor to the polygraph, which at the time was
43
an incipient technology. Frye, the defendant, argued that his
test results should be excluded because the theory on which the
systolic test was based was not widely accepted by the legal or
44
scientific community. The Court agreed, and in a two-page decision that would later be adopted by nearly all federal and
45
state jurisdictions, held that a field of science, the application
37. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 22 (recommending that
“[t]he National Institute of Forensic Science should competitively fund peerreviewed research” for, among other things, “[s]tudies establishing the scientific bases demonstrating the validity of forensic methods” and “[t]he development and establishment of quantifiable measures of the reliability and accuracy of forensic analysis”).
38. See Ulery et al., supra note 32, at 7733.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
43. Id. at 1013–14.
44. Id. at 1014.
45. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5TH
453 (2001) (discussing states’ and other federal circuits’ adoption of Frye).
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of a particular field of science, or even a non-scientific technique was admissible only if the judge could find that such
“general acceptance” by a meaningful segment of the relevant
46
expert community existed.
47
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 702 governed expert testimony and allowed experts to testify to their opinions in court provided their opinions were predicated on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”
and supported by the expert’s “knowledge, skill, experience,
48
training, or education.”
The Supreme Court was asked to evaluate Frye’s applicability to scientific testimony under Rule 702 in Daubert v. Mer49
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. In Daubert, the plaintiff submitted in vitro studies of animals, reanalysis of existing
studies, and pharmacological studies to establish that the drug
50
Bendectin could cause birth defects. At the trial stage, the defendants won summary judgment because, under Frye, the
plaintiff’s experts’ methods for arriving at their conclusion
51
were not generally accepted. The Supreme Court reversed,
and held that Frye’s “general acceptance” standard did not control courts’ admissibility determinations under the Federal
52
Rules of Evidence; in so holding, the Court overruled Frye.
The Court explained that under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the trial judge’s function was one of “gatekeep[er]” for expert
53
testimony. In making a gatekeeping admissibility determination, a trial judge’s ultimate inquiry is whether the proffered
expert testimony is both relevant to the proceeding at hand and
54
reliable. The Daubert Court was careful to distinguish between “evidentiary reliability” and “scientific reliability,” noting
that “evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validi55
ty.” The Court enumerated five non-exhaustive factors to aid
46. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
47. Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
48. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 93 (Supp. 1974).
49. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
50. Id. at 582–83.
51. Id. at 584.
52. Id. at 588 (“Nothing in the text [of Rule 702] establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.”).
53. Id. at 597.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 590 n.9.

1590

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1581

trial judges in determining whether a particular scientific
technique or theory is scientifically valid, and thus legally reli56
able. Critically, these factors require falsifiability (testing),
and validity (known error rate, peer review, maintenance of
standards, and general acceptance).
Daubert addressed “scientific” knowledge under Rule 702,
but was silent as to Rule 702’s other two prongs: “technical
57
knowledge,” and “other specialized knowledge.” Following
Daubert, federal courts and scholars disputed whether the
Daubert factors applied outside the scientific context, and many
courts restricted their application of the factors to testimony
they deemed “science,” declining to apply the factors to non58
scientific “technical” or “specialized knowledge.” The Supreme
59
Court clarified this issue in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. In
Kumho Tire, the Court clarified that a court’s ultimate inquiries—relevance and evidentiary reliability—were the same for
60
all expert testimony under Rule 702, scientific or not. The
Court wrote that there was “no relevant distinction” among the

56. The factors the Court enumerated were (1) whether the technique or
theory at issue can be tested, id. at 593; (2) “whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication,” id. at 593; (3) whether the
technique or theory at issue has a known error rate, id. at 594; (4) whether
“standards controlling the technique’s operation” exist, id.; and (5) whether
the theory “ha[d] achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Id.
57. FED R. EVID. 702; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (characterizing the Daubert majority as focusing on “scientific
knowledge” while remaining silent on the issues of “technical knowledge” and
“other specialized knowledge”).
58. See, e.g., Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.
1998) (“[B]ecause [the proffered expert’s] declaration does not constitute ‘scientific’ testimony, but rather testimony based on the doctor’s training and experience, the standards set out in [Daubert], governing admissibility of scientific expert testimony, do not apply.”); Sorenson v. Robert B. Miller & Assocs.,
No. 95-5085, 1996 WL 515351, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1996) (concluding that
the Daubert factors are unhelpful when applied to technical knowledge); Berry
v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the Daubert
factors are of “limited help” in a case regarding the admissibility of police testimony based solely on experience and not the scientific method); see also Linda Sandstrom Simard & William G. Young, Daubert’s Gatekeeper: The Role of
the District Judge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1457, 1471
(1994) (“Although the specific factors noted by the Daubert Court may indicate
the reliability of scientific knowledge, however, they might not offer probative
evidence of reliability for all types of expert testimony.”).
59. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
60. Id. at 149 (“We conclude that Daubert’s general principles apply to the
expert matters described in Rule 702.”).
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61

three prongs of Rule 702, and that therefore federal courts
that grounded their admissibility decisions in such a distinction
62
were incorrect. The Court wrote that a trial judge may assess
evidentiary reliability using the Daubert factors provided the
63
testimony is ultimately found to be relevant and reliable. The
Court did not hold, however, that a trial judge must apply the
Daubert factors to non-scientific testimony. Whether a court
should use the Daubert factors in determining the admissibility
of non-scientific expert testimony, the Kumho Tire Court wrote,
“depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular
64
case at issue,” and noted that some Daubert factors may or
may not be relevant to a court’s admissibility decision in a giv65
en case.
Kumho Tire thus empowered district court judges with
broad discretion in assessing reliability and relevance of expert
testimony. As the next Part will show, however, that discretion
sometimes led to admissibility decisions that were directly at
odds with the principles outlined in Daubert, the case Kumho
Tire purportedly clarified.
II. ADMISSIBILITY AND SCOPE OF TESTIMONY
This Part addresses three distinct components of the postKumho Tire landscape. Section A examines post-Kumho Tire
courts’ various rationales for admitting forensics testimony.
Section B examines the scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony post-Kumho Tire and argues that once in the witness
chair, forensics practitioners tend to overstate the capabilities
of their fields and make assertions that are belied by their
fields’ respective deficiencies regarding falsifiability and validity. Section C argues that, under existing Rule 702 precedent,
forensics’ scientific deficiencies should affect the weight and
scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony but should not bar
forensics’ admissibility altogether.

61. Id. at 147.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 149.
64. Id. at 150.
65. Id. at 151 (“In certain cases, it will be appropriate . . . to ask, for example, how often an . . . expert’s experience-based methodology has produced
erroneous results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the relevant . . . community.”).
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A. POST-KUMHO TIRE RATIONALES FOR ADMISSIBILITY
Kumho Tire was a “wake-up call for defense counsel in
66
criminal cases.” Prior to Kumho Tire, defense counsel tended
to “assume[] that [forensics] experts could do what they
claimed they did,” and not challenge forensic fields or tech67
niques. Kumho Tire, for the first time, “raised the issue of
what bases all experts [not just scientists] have to support their
testimony” and thus opened new doors for admissibility chal68
lenges on the basis of forensics’ reliability and validity. These
defense attorneys reasoned that Kumho Tire gave them more
“freedom to provide reliability factors [distinct from Daubert’s
69
factors] to corroborate their expert’s testimony.” Despite a
slew of challenges to forensics testimony on the basis of that
testimony’s lack of scientific validity, post-Kumho Tire courts
70
nonetheless tended to admit forensics testimony.
Some post-Kumho Tire courts justified their admission of
forensics testimony by purportedly applying Daubert’s factors
but stretching their meaning to the brink. For example, in
71
United States v. Havvard, the district court characterized fingerprint identification as “the very archetype of reliable expert
72
testimony under [Daubert and Kumho Tire]” and found that
the error rate of fingerprint examination was “vanishingly
73
small” with no meaningful explanation as to how it arrived at
that conclusion. As to Daubert’s testing requirement, the
Havvard court reasoned that because fingerprinting had withstood a century of adversarial testing, it was reliable for
74
Daubert purposes. The Havvard court misread Daubert entirely: Daubert is unconcerned with testimony’s ability to withstand the crucible of litigation; it is concerned with whether ex-

66. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 1:30.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the
Downs, the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho’s Expansion of
Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689, 736 (2001).
70. See DeCoux, supra note 19, at 132 (“[P]rosecutors fending off challenges to the reliability of their expert witnesses enjoy a success rate of ninetytwo percent in trial courts and ninety-eight percent in appellate courts.”).
71. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
72. Id. at 855.
73. Id. at 854.
74. Id. at 854 –55.
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pert testimony rises to the level of scientific reliability. To that
end, Daubert’s testing requirement, which arose specifically in
the scientific context, addressed scientific falsifiability, not
76
cross-examination in a courtroom. The Havvard court misunderstood the principles upon which the Daubert Court based its
rationale and consequently misapplied Daubert’s factors.
Other post-Kumho Tire courts grappling with forensics testimony took notice of Kumho Tire’s instruction that trial courts
need not always consider the Daubert factors, provided that the
proffered testimony is otherwise reliable and relevant. In Unit77
ed States v. Williams, the Second Circuit upheld the admission of a firearm-and-toolmark analyst’s testimony that shell
casings found at the scene of a homicide matched those fired
from the defendant’s gun. The court noted Kumho Tire’s clarification that the specific Daubert factors are nonexhaustive and
therefore chose to ignore them altogether as criteria to assess
78
the testimony’s admissibility. The Court found the testimony
reliable not because the method of firearm and toolmark identification relied on by the expert was scientifically valid, but because the particular expert in that case had extensive train79
ing. The implication, of course, is that in the Second Circuit,
the testimony of a firearm-and-toolmark expert with twenty
years’ experience is more reliable than an expert with ten
80
years’ experience. This confirms the subjective nature of this
type of testimony: an experienced examiner’s conclusions are
more reliable than an inexperienced examiner’s conclusions only if the nature of the conclusion was essentially a subjective
judgment.
A third set of post-Kumho Tire courts combine the two approaches: relying on some Daubert factors, but not others. For
75. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993)
(stating that “evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity”).
76. Id. at 593 (specifically linking the “testing” factor to falsifiability in a
scientific sense).
77. 506 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2007).
78. Although the Williams court did take notice of the Daubert factors, id.
at 160, it did not apply any of them to the firearm-and-toolmark examiner’s
methodology, id. at 161–62.
79. Id. at 161 (“Daubert was satisfied here . . . [ because of the expert’s]
service as a firearms examiner for approximately twelve years; her receipt of
‘hands-on training’ from her section supervisor . . . ; her experience examining
approximately 2,800 different types of firearms; and her prior expert testimony on between twenty and thirty occasions.”).
80. Id. (“We do not wish this opinion to be taken as saying that any proffered ballistic expert should be routinely admitted.”).
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example, in United States v. Ford, the Third Circuit upheld a
trial court’s admission of the prosecution’s shoeprint analyst’s
81
testimony linking the defendant to the crime scene. The theory of footprint analysis is based on the assumption that each
person’s footprint is potentially unique, due to the type of shoes
worn, unique characteristics acquired as the shoes are worn,
and how weight and gait affect the impression the shoe leaves
82
on the ground. The examiner compares a shoeprint left in the
83
ground to characteristics of a criminal suspect and determines, based on training and experience, whether the two
match, or at minimum whether the suspect can be excluded as
84
a match.
The Ford Court noted that the district court found that the
examiner’s techniques were “general[ly] accept[ed] . . . subject
to peer review . . . [and that] the potential error rate is
85
known.” However, the court also noted in a footnote that the
error rate for shoeprint analysis “has not been firmly estab86
lished,” and that, after Kumho Tire, “a strict application of the
Daubert factors” to forensics testimony was probably a “fruit87
less exercise.” Put simply, Ford belies itself: it upholds shoeprint testimony’s admission as reliable under Daubert while at
the same time explaining why shoeprint testimony is unreliable
according to scientific notions of falsifiability and validity.
At least one court has grappled with forensics’ admissibility following the National Research Council studies which
88
questioned forensics’ scientific reliability. In United States v.
89
Love, the district court relied on the May 2011 Proceedings of
90
the National Academy of Sciences study when concluding that
fingerprint analysis had an error rate of 0.01%. However, the
Love court ignored crucial passages of the study that noted that
81. 481 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2007).
82. SUZANNE BELL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 324 –25 (2008).
83. For example, if the examiner knows that the suspect weighs 250
pounds, she may infer that the suspect’s shoeprint may be deeper in the
ground than that of someone who weighs 150 pounds. See id. (“[E]ach person
will generate unique [shoe impression patterns] based on their weight, gait,
and how they use and wear the shoes.”).
84. Id.; see also id. at 218 (defining “individualization” of physical evidence as the process of “linking” that evidence to a “common source”).
85. Ford, 481 F.3d at 218.
86. Id. at 218 n.4.
87. Id. at 218 n.5.
88. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
89. No. 10-CR-2418-MMM, 2011 WL 2173644 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011).
90. Id. at *3 (citing Ulery et al., supra note 32, at 7733, 7735).
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91

fingerprint analysis was fundamentally subjective and that
“there is currently no objective basis for determining the sufficiency of information necessary to reach a fingerprint examina92
tion decision.”
The forensic techniques at issue in Havvard, Williams,
Ford, and Love “utterly fail to meet Daubert’s basic criteria . . . [of] reliability beyond the ipse dixit of those who prac93
tice them.” The hypothesis that two people wearing identical
shoes will produce distinct, unique prints has never been test94
95
ed; nor has the notion that all fingerprints are unique; nor
has the proposition that firearm barrels leave unique marks on
shell casings. Moreover, all three techniques require the subjective assessment of the examiner to determine that any similari96
ties between items are significant. Since subjective judgments
97
cannot be objectively falsified, it is impossible to know the er98
ror rate of any of the techniques in these cases. None of these
91. Ulery et al., supra note 32 (“Latent print examiners compare latents
to exemplars, using their expertise rather than a quantitative standard to determine if the information content is sufficient to make a decision.”).
92. Ulery et al., supra note 32, at 7738.
93. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 1:30 n.4.
94. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 72 (2009) (“No data
supports [the] opinion” that “the effect of gait on the sole of a shoe is unique.”).
95. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 267 (4th Cir. 2003) (referring to
a fingerprint expert who “was unable to reference any study establishing that
no two persons share the same fingerprint; she was able only to testify that no
study had ever proven this premise false”); see also 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra
note 21, § 32:1 (“Many of the most basic claims of fingerprint identification
have never been tested empirically, and the field’s most thoughtful research
and scholarship have concluded that, in the strong form in which they are
usually presented, those claims in fact are unprovable.”).
96. See Saks, supra note 30, at 883 (“Forensic . . . examinations are overwhelmingly subjective affairs. . . . [T]he field requires [fingerprinting] experts
to be doubly subjective: Not only must they reach a subjective judgment about
the likelihood of a coincidental match, but they may not testify to an identification unless they believe that every other fingerprint expert’s subjective judgment would render the same conclusion. Thus, fingerprint examiners must
draw subjective impressions about other people’s subjective impressions.”).
97. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 5:2.
98. Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1033 (2005) (“The
existing data are inadequate to calculate a meaningful error rate for forensic
fingerprint identification.”); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates
for Human Latent Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339, 339 (Nalini Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004) (“It is
impossible to determine from existing data whether true error rates are
miniscule or substantial.”); see also United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167
WHA, 2007 WL 485967, at *8 (“The peer-reviewed literature and the three ex-
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techniques is scientifically valid, because all three methodolo99
gies suffer from confirmation bias: by looking primarily for
similarities among fingerprints, shell casings, and shoeprints,
the examiner selectively identifies information that confirms
her theory while ignoring areas of dissimilarity.
Ford, Havvard, Williams, and Love are only a few of many
examples of federal courts’ admitting forensics testimony while
disregarding Daubert’s command that legal reliability equates
100
with scientific validity. After Kumho Tire, courts apparently
concluded that they are no longer required to link scientific re101
liability to admissibility for any type of expert testimony. In
cases where courts directly apply Daubert’s factors, as in
Havvard, they misconstrue the meaning of those factors,
stretching their meaning beyond what the Daubert court intended.
B. SCOPE OF TESTIMONY AT TRIAL, POST-KUMHO TIRE
During trial, forensics practitioners often testify with confidence about the accuracy of their fields. That is, even if courts
take notice of forensics’ deficiencies with respect to the scientific
method and scientific reliability, those courts rarely limit the
scope of practitioners’ testimony because of those deficiencies.
Many forensics practitioners make bold claims about their
field’s accuracy and reliability. For example, more than one fingerprinting analyst has testified before a jury that fingerprint
identification has a negligible error rate (one percent or less)
when the technique is applied properly by trained examiners;
any error, they said, was a result of human misapplication of
102
the methodology, not the methodology itself. As recently as
June 2011, a fingerprint examiner testified in United States v.
Love that “[e]rrors [in the fingerprinting process] occur, but
perts who testified conceded that it is not possible to calculate an absolute error rate for firearms identification.”).
99. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
233 (1993) (defining “confirmation bias,” and giving examples).
100. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993).
101. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–48 (stating that,
in the scientific context, evidentiary reliability meant scientific validity, but
evidentiary reliability in other contexts might mean something else depending
on the nature of the particular case).
102. United States v. Llera-Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Penn. 2002)
(FBI fingerprint examiner testified that the error rate of fingerprinting generally was approximately one percent); Larkin v. Yates, CV 09-2034 -DSF, 2009
WL 2049991, at *16 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (fingerprint expert testified at trial that
the error rate of the field was 0.08%).
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those errors are human errors resulting from human implementation of the . . . process. Because human errors are nonsystematic . . . there is no overall predictive error rate in latent
103
fingerprint analysis.”
These examples are not unique to fingerprint analysts.
Most forensics examiners are trained to either testify with absolute certainty or not at all. A firearm-and-toolmark examiner
testified that, applying generally accepted principles of firearm
and toolmark identification, “if two cartridge cases share the
same magazine mark, then one could say with one hundred
percent certainty that the two cartridge cases had been cycled
104
through the same magazine.” Even a forensic shoe print analyst “offered a potential error rate of zero for the method, stat105
ing that any error is attributable to examiners.”
These statements about the purported error rate of forensic
techniques strain credulity at best and are deceitful at worst.
They completely upend the meaning of “error rate” as used in
Daubert and in traditional science. When the Daubert Court
spoke of “error rate,” it referred to the scientific validity of
106
the way we know how often a technique
measurements:
measures what it purports to measure is because we know how
often the technique does not measure what it purports to measure. Scientific validity can only be established through objective
107
testing and an application of the scientific method. Scientific
validity cannot be established through the basis of most foren108
sic conclusions: the subjective opinion of the practitioner.
Still other forensics practitioners go further, testifying to
their level of certainty in particular cases. For example, one
firearm-and-toolmark examiner concluded with “100% certainty” that specific shell casings found at a crime scene matched
109
the defendant’s gun. While testifying to a level of certainty
was historically endorsed by some medical authorities, some
organizations have subsequently prohibited experts to make
110
such sweeping claims.
103. United States v. Love, No. 10CR2418-MMM, 2011 WL 2173644 at *5
(S.D. Cal., June 1, 2011).
104. Sexton v. State, 93 S.W.3d 96, 98–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
105. United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006).
106. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
107. See PYREK, supra note 33, at 245–75.
108. Cooley, supra note 30, at 343 (“[D]ata for the individualizing forensic
sciences are non-existent and nearly impossible to calculate.”).
109. United States v. McCaleb, 302 Fed. App’x 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).
110. Compare Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 90 n.30 (1st Cir.
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This type of bold certitude renders such testimony decidedly un-scientific. Science’s lexicon is that of uncertainty, not cer111
tainty. Indeed, “[w]ithout skepticism there can be no science,
112
because uncertainty promotes growth.” The very nature of
traditional science dictates that as more and better data becomes available, previous assumptions about a state of affairs
is called into doubt, replaced by new and better established hy113
potheses.
And yet some forensics practitioners continue to simultaneously claim both certainty in their conclusions and scientific
basis in their methods. This dissonance may be explained by
the forensics examiner’s continuing role as a state agent, testifying on behalf of the prosecution. “Error is a concept that
causes a good deal of consternation in the minds of forensic scientists” due to “a widespread belief” that identifying errors in
past testimony “will be used to discredit them in court” in the
114
future or even “compromise their entire career.” Understandably then, these practitioners have an incentive to make “bold
115
absolute[]” findings in their fields of expertise to bolster their
expert reputations. Uncertainty is “antithetical to prosecutorial
116
criminal law;” consequently, the more doubt a practitioner
expresses about the error rate of his field generally or his con-

2005) (citing AM. BD. OF FORENSIC ODONTOLOGISTS, Bite-Mark Terminology
Guidelines (1995) (arguing that the ABFO’s guidelines conflate “several arguably distinct levels of certainty,” even equating “reasonable degree of medical
certainty” with “virtual certainty”)), with AM. BD. OF FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY,
Policies, Procedures, Guidelines, & Standards, in DIPLOMATES REFERENCE
MANUAL 57, 77, 114 –18 (2012) (reasonable medical certainty is defined as
“beyond reasonable doubt,” and that bitemark “[t]erms assuring unconditional
identification of a perpetrator, or without doubt, are not sanctioned as a final
conclusion”).
111. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“It
would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony
must be ‘known’ to a certainty . . . there are no certainties in science.”).
112. Cooley, supra note 30, at 362.
113. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 259–61; see also Julie E. Blend,
Using Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation, 17 REV. LITIG. 27, 36 (1998)
(“[S]cientists can and do distinguish between ‘good science’ and ‘bad science.’
They go about this principally by assessing the extent to which the theory or
technique has survived the rigors of testing and replication by other scientists.”).
114. See John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions
and Rationale of Forensic Identification, in 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 21,
at 1, 29.
115. BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16, at 67.
116. Cooley, supra note 30, at 365.
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clusions in a specific case, the less likely it becomes that prose117
cutors will rely on him in future cases.
C. THE COURTS’ CONUNDRUM: EXCLUSION VS. SCOPE OF
TESTIMONY
In light of forensics’ demonstrated failure to meet scientific
standards of validity, reliability, and falsifiability, courts considering forensics evidence face a conundrum: whether the evidence’s scientific deficiencies render it so unreliable as to warrant exclusion from courtrooms. Under Kumho Tire, that
forensic techniques fail to meet traditional scientific standards
does not bar their admissibility. However, forensics’ deficiencies should affect a court’s determination about whether to limit the scope of a forensics practitioner’s testimony once on the
witness stand.
Many scholars have addressed forensics’ scientific deficien118
cies. These scholars tend to argue that forensic techniques
should be excluded to the extent they fail to satisfy traditional
119
notions of scientific validity, falsifiability and reliability. For
example, Prof. Adina Schwartz, a longtime critic of firearm and
toolmark testimony, argues that “because of . . . systemic scientific problems, firearms and toolmark identification testimony
120
should be inadmissible across-the-board.” Prof. Simon Cole,
in a review of fingerprinting cases, noted that “fingerprint identification might be inadmissible under . . . Daubert/Kumho” be121
cause of scientific deficiencies in the technique. Professor David Faigman, reacting to a case in which a district court

117. See, e.g., BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16, at 67 (“If a firearms examiner is impeached . . . his or her ability to testify in other cases can be severely affected; being associated with an error or misidentification can tarnish
reputations.”).
118. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1189 (2004); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of
Fingerprint ‘Science’ is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002); Garrett &
Neufeld, supra note 94; Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 1 (2005). These, of course, represent only a small sample of
the vast scholarship documenting forensic techniques’ failures to satisfy science’s requirements.
119. See, e.g., David L. Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1390 (2008)
(“[A] necessary precondition for admissibility is basic [scientific] validity.”).
120. Schwartz, supra note 118, at 3.
121. Cole, supra note 118, at 1246 n.247.
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122

excluded fingerprint evidence (a ruling on which the court
123
quickly reversed itself) said “[t]here are a lot of emperors out
there testifying who have no clothes. Where’s the science be124
hind it? Where’s the data?”
Although these scholars are correct in their diagnosis of
the disease (forensics, as has been shown here and elsewhere
fail to meet scientific standards of reliability and validity), their
prescribed course of treatment (drawing a nexus between admissibility and traditional science) is misguided. Non-scientific
expert testimony is generally admissible in federal courts.
Kumho Tire specifically ruled that distinctions among “scientific,” “technical,” and “specialized knowledge” under Rule 702
125
are immaterial to courts’ admissibility determination. Further, the Kumho Tire Court found that the specific factors in
Daubert—which evaluate the evidentiary reliability, falsifiability, and scientific validity—may be inapplicable in some cases
where experience, and not traditional science, was the principal
126
basis of the expert’s opinion. Indeed, Kumho Tire held that
the Daubert factors were “meant to be helpful, not definitive”
127
and all may not be inapplicable altogether. Consequently, a
technique need not be science qua science to be admissible under Rule 702, and that forensics fail to meet traditional science’s rigors cannot bar their admissibility.
For example, under Kumho Tire, police officers are permitted to testify on the basis of experience alone as to the meaning
of “street terminology” if such a translation will aid a jury in
128
understanding the lexicon of the illicit drug trade. Similarly,

122. United States v. Llera Plaza, Nos. CR 98-362-10, CR 98-362-11, CR
98-362-12, 2002 WL 27305, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002) (Plaza I).
123. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(Plaza II) (vacating Plaza I, which was withdrawn from the Federal Supplement).
124. Cole, supra note 118, at 1246 n.250 (citing Joann Loviglio, Reliability
of Fingerprint Evidence on Trial in Philadelphia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 24,
2002).
125. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999).
126. Id. at 141 (arguing that the Daubert factors “neither necessarily nor
exclusively apply to all experts or in every case”).
127. Id. at 151.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 276 (4th Cir. 2007)
(reasoning that the Daubert factors were inapplicable and that “because the
primary purpose of coded drug language is to conceal the meaning of the conversation from outsiders through deliberate obscurity, drug traffickers’ jargon
is a specialized body of knowledge and thus an appropriate subject for expert
testimony” (citing United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 211 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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engineers are permitted to testify on the basis of their training
and experience, not the scientific method, that a product was
129
built to industry standards. Like forensics practitioners, the
police officer and the engineer apply their subjective judgment
to objective data they gathered working in their respective
fields.
Indeed, on one level, the only meaningful difference between forensics practitioners and other experience-based experts is the level of certainty that they express. The police officer does not testify “with 100% certainty” that his
130
interpretation of the drug lexicon is accurate, nor does the
engineer testify that his opinion as to product safety “has zero
131
error rate” when it does not. To the contrary, they testify as
to the details of their relative experiences in their fields, explain their methodology dispassionately, and explain their con132
clusions. Forensics practitioners, by contrast, tend to make
broad pronouncements regarding the high degree of accuracy
and objectivity of their field and techniques without scientific
133
basis for such claims.
Thus, although forensic techniques’ deficiencies cannot bar
their admissibility, these methods’ fallibilities are reason to
limit the scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony once it is
admitted to prevent practitioners from making unfounded
claims about their fields’ capacity for certainty. The scope of an
expert witness’s testimony is significant, principally because
jurors tend to defer to experts, and an expert testifying in bold,
129. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1006–09 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that engineers are permitted to testify on the basis of experience in the
field following Kumho Tire).
130. See STEVEN D. STEWART, CLARK CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT’Y, EFFECTIVE COURTROOM PERFORMANCE FOR INDIANA LAW ENFORCEMENT (2011),
available at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/victim/ptips.pdf (Jan. 11, 2011)
(advising that police officers be honest: “Do not guess or make up an answer. If
you do not know the answer it is best to say, ‘I don’t know.’ If you are asked
about details that you do not remember it is best to say, ‘I don’t remember’”).
131. See Brief of The National Academy of Engineering as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Kumho Tire Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)
(No. 97-1709), 1998 WL 541971 (arguing that “[ b]ecause engineers frequently
rely on calculations and testing, ‘the known or potential rate of error’ of a
technique for evaluating failure bears directly on that technique’s validity within the engineering discipline,” but not claiming a particular level of accuracy).
132. See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 130 (“Answer all questions directly.
Answer only the questions asked, then stop.”).
133. See BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 16, at 67 (noting that forensics
practitioners often make “bold absolute” claims); supra notes 102–10 and accompanying text.
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conclusory fashion that his technique is ninety-nine percent ac134
curate will undoubtedly have prejudicial effects on the jury.
Mere deference to the adversarial process will not prevent a
practitioner from making unfounded claims in court. A crossexamination of a forensics expert as to the falsifiability of his
methodology or the known error rate of his field will inevitably
descend into a debate between the attorney and the witness on
the finer points of statistics, the meaning of scientific validity,
base-rate data, or other technicalities whose discussion distracts the jury from its purpose. Indeed, these are the very issues that, under Daubert and Kumho Tire, the judge is supposed to determine. Deference to the adversarial process on the
scope of testimony, therefore, runs counter to the very “judgeas-gatekeeper” principle that Daubert and Kumho Tire have
endorsed.
In short, although the deficiencies of forensics from a scientific perspective should matter to courts, under Kumho Tire,
the field’s insufficiency as a scientific discipline may affect the
scope of a practitioner’s testimony, not its admissibility.
III. DAUBERT RISES: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF
FORENSICS TESTIMONY
The notion that the remedy to concerns surrounding the
evidentiary reliability of forensics lies in limiting the practitioner’s sworn speech is not new or unique—several district
courts have limited the scope of firearm-and-toolmark witness135
es to varying degrees. However, these courts grounded their
134. See, e.g., Jeffrey Heinrick, Everyone’s an Expert: The CSI Effect’s Negative Impact on Juries, TRIPLE HELIX, Fall 2006, at 60; Neil Vidmar, Expert
Evidence, the Adversary System, and the Jury, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH SUPPLEMENT S137, S138 (2005) (“Among cases that eventually went to trial, physician ratings of whether negligence had occurred were positively related to
jury verdicts at a statistically significant level.”).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536(D. Md. 2009).
In Willock, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation
limiting a firearm-and-toolmark examiner’s testimony so that the examiner
could not “opine that it is a ‘practical impossibility’ for any other firearm to
have fired the cartridges other than the common ‘unknown firearm’ to which
[the examiner] attributes the cartridges.” Id. at 574. See also, e.g., United
States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 –75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ( permitting
firearm-and-toolmark examiner to testify only that a bullet “more likely than
not” came from the suspect’s gun, and not to his degree of certainty); United
States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (D. Mass 2006) (allowing firearms
expert to testify that a bullet came from a suspect’s gun “to a reasonable degree of certainty” and prohibiting the witness from framing his conclusion in
terms of ”an exact statistical certainty”).
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limitations as to scope of testimony on case-specific factors. In
cases involving forensics—where proffered evidence is unreliable but not so unreliable as to merit wholesale exclusion—
courts do not seem to have agreed-upon a methodology for how,
or to what extent, a forensics practitioner’s testimony should be
limited. This Part proposes such a methodology: given the need
to limit the scope of forensics experts to mitigate the effects of
conclusory or absolutist testimony, the Daubert factors are the
solution.
Following their initial admissibility determination under
Daubert and Kumho Tire, courts should reapply the Daubert
factors to the proposed testimony, using the factors as rough
boundaries of the testimony’s scope. To the extent that a practitioner satisfies a particular Daubert factor, she may testify to
conclusions or opinions that fall materially under that factor.
To the extent a witness fails to satisfy a factor, she may not testify to conclusions or opinions that fall materially under that
factor. This is not to say, however, that forensics practitioners
should not be permitted to testify to objective data points they
observed—training and experience alone is a sufficient reliabil136
ity factor for these types of identifications.
The reapplication of Daubert to the scope of forensics practitioners’ testimony would produce results both faithful to
Daubert and Kumho Tire and mindful of the myriad issues of
falsifiability and scientific validity the forensics field engenders. To demonstrate how, consider the following hypothetical.
A firearm-and-toolmark examiner testifies in limine that (1)
she found “agreement” based on twelve matching class characteristics and five matching individual characteristics between
shell casings at a crime scene and a defendant’s firearm; (2) the
field of firearm-and-toolmark analysis is ninety-eight percent
accurate based on her department’s internal assessments; and
(3) in this case, she is “virtually certain” that her conclusion is
accurate. Under Kumho Tire, the first piece of testimony, that
there are matching class and individual characteristics, is readily admissible—this is not opinion, but observable data. Even
her conclusion that there is “agreement” between the casings is
admissible under Kumho Tire—this is a conclusion based on
training and experience, much like the police officer’s testifying

136. Rule 702 expressly authorizes expert testimony on the basis of experience and training, but it, like the Supreme Court case law interpreting it, is
silent on the issue of scope of testimony.
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to the unique vocabulary of illicit narcotics trafficking. However, her testimony that her field is ninety-eight percent accurate is an empirical (that is, scientific) claim; one which is not
scientifically valid. There is no way to know whether the methodology of firearm-and-toolmark analysis measures what it
purports to measure ninety-eight percent of the time, because
the field’s conclusions are made entirely on the basis of subjec138
tive opinions of the various participants in it. Thus, she may
not testify to her error rate under Daubert’s “known error rate”
factor, as her error rate is her opinion, and not “known.” Similarly, because her conclusion that she is “virtually certain” that
the two shell casings match is based on her opinion, not falsifiable tests, she may not testify to her level of certainty under
139
Daubert’s “testing” prong. Using Daubert as a metric on the
scope-of-testimony inquiry, she would be able to testify as to
her opinion, but not to its degree of scientific certainty. Her
conclusions would be presented as what they are, the opinion of
a practitioner—and not a scientific conclusion. Under this
framework, the practitioner would be a vehicle for observable
data, not a generator of conjecture passing itself off as science.
Some might believe that the distinction this solution depends upon—scope of testimony versus admissibility—is one
without a difference. They might argue that admissibility is the
ultimate question, and that the reasons a forensics practitioner’s testimony is reliable for admissibility purposes is the same
reason it is reliable for scope of testimony purposes, and therefore the former should inform the scope of the latter. The difference, however, is in the Daubert opinion itself. The Daubert
Court cautioned that “[t]he focus [of the trial judge’s admissibility decision] must be solely on principles and methodology,
140
not on the conclusions that they generate.” Thus, although
the Daubert Court cautioned against too-heavy a focus on con-

137. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 276 (4th Cir. 2007) (a
police officer may testify on the basis of training and experience as to the
meaning of certain words unique to the illegal drug trade).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 WL
485967 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (describing that the firearm examiner conceded that the error rate of the technique is not known in the scientific sense
and erroneously reasoned that the falsifiability prong Daubert is satisfied despite “[t]he few critiques—such as the impossibility of calculating a true error
rate and the fact that there can be no statistical, objective verification of an
examiner’s conclusions”).
139. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
140. Id. at 595.
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clusions at the admissibility stage, it was silent as to the scope
of testimony.
This Note does not purport to suggest the myriad ways
that courts might adopt this solution in particular cases. It
does, however, argue that the re-application of Daubert when
determining the scope of forensics expert’s testimony is a principled way under Kumho Tire of balancing information that
would be helpful to the jury against the need to exclude testimony that vastly overstates the capabilities of both forensics
and individual examiners in light of those fields’ documented
deficiencies with respect to falsifiability and scientific validity.
CONCLUSION
The myriad disciplines within the field of forensics attempt
to pass themselves off as science. Those within the those disciplines may make empirical claims, but apply subjective judgments, selective data, and a bias towards the state in criminal
cases when making those claims. However, under Kumho Tire,
this alone cannot be a wholesale bar to this testimony’s admissibility. The solution is to limit the scope of the expert’s testimony once admitted using the Daubert reliability factors as
guideposts. Doing so will lead to juries presented with information not riddled with “bold absolute” testimony from practitioners with no scientific basis to make the claims they do.

